Problems We Solve
Practical OT cybersecurity improvement starts with the real engineering problem
Meridian helps industrial teams define the problem clearly, understand operational impact, and develop proportionate actions that can be delivered in live environments.
Problem areas
Use these pages to move from a broad concern into the specific operating constraint, evidence gap or engineering decision that needs attention.
Each problem page explains the practical impact before recommending a service route.
The focus is on live OT constraints such as access, downtime, legacy assets and supplier systems.
Related links point toward review outputs, assurance evidence and practical next steps.
Many industrial facilities still operate with flat OT networks where PLCs, HMIs, engineering workstations, historians, and third-party systems share common network paths.
Industrial sites often rely on older PLCs, SCADA platforms, unmanaged switches, unsupported operating systems, and vendor-specific communications.
Many projects reference IEC 62443 but lack a clear method for defining the system under consideration, security zones, conduits, target security levels, and verification evidence.
Cybersecurity requirements are often introduced late in control system projects, causing delays during design review, FAT, SAT, or client acceptance.
Industrial sites frequently depend on remote support connections that were added for maintenance convenience before formal OT security controls existed.
Cybersecurity decisions are difficult when sites lack reliable records of PLCs, HMIs, switches, servers, engineering workstations, interfaces, and data flows.
Production networks often grow over time through unmanaged switches, temporary connections, and undocumented changes.
Vendor package systems are often integrated into wider control networks without enough review of interfaces, access routes, testing evidence, or support responsibilities.